



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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New Trends in the UN

by Mario Rossi

The 12th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which ended on December 14, 1957, was held under the spell of Soviet scientific and technical achievements. The 82 member nations could not have been more keenly aware of the new turn in world politics, and the ensuing shift in the balance of power, had the beep-beep of the Soviet sputnik echoed in the assembly halls or the intercontinental ballistic missile cast its ominous shadow over the glass frame of UN headquarters.

By contrast to the Soviet exhibition of benevolent self-confidence the West showed a defensive attitude, a first indication of those doubts and fears of which the NATO conference in Paris, inaugurated the day following the UN Assembly's adjournment, later furnished clear evidence. These shifts in emphasis and moods found the representatives of the vast, restless mass of humanity outside the power blocs increasingly noncommittal, but also conscious of their strength and ready to press their various claims.

Under these circumstances the establishment under United States sponsorship of a Special Projects Fund assumes particular sig-

nificance. The fund was set up as "an expansion of the technical assistance and development activities of the United Nations" in order to provide "systematic and sustained assistance in fields essential to the integrated technical, economic and social development of the less-developed countries." In view of the limited resources available at this time, which are not likely to exceed \$100 million annually, the operations of the Special Fund "shall more immediately be directed towards enlarging the scope of the United Nations programs of technical assistance. . . ."

The resolution unanimously adopted by the Assembly, however, has considered also the prospect that if larger resources become available, it might be possible for the UN "to enter into the field of capital development, principally the development of the economic and social infrastructure of the less-developed countries." At that time the Assembly "shall review the scope and future activities of the fund" and take appropriate action.

This is considerably less than the underdeveloped countries had advocated, but also considerably more than they had expected to get.

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The large industrialized countries, and particularly the United States, had consistently maintained that a UN fund for economic development was contingent on disarmament. The establishment of the Special Fund does not imply an official departure from this traditional position but opens the prospect of an increasing UN role in assisting the economic development of underdeveloped countries. It represents a step toward internationalization of government contributions, which offers the best guarantees against their use for political purposes. While the fulfillment of this hope still lies far in the future, the Afro-Asians and the Latin Americans rightly felt that the United States had moved in a direction they had long advocated and were obviously quite pleased.

What is 'Colonialism'?

In another field of special interest to the Afro-Asians, that of anticolonialism, interesting new trends have emerged. The debate on the question of Cyprus showed clearly that the rule of one nation over a people belonging to the same continent or the same color group, while open to condemnation, is not considered colonialism. A Greek-sponsored resolution which would have recognized the Cypriots' right of self-determination was not supported by any Asian country, except Indonesia. A few voted against it, while the others abstained.

This attitude unmistakably indicates that anticolonialism has a racial connotation and refers to the contin-

ued struggle of people of color against the white man. According to this interpretation, colonialism exists when a nation belonging to one continent rules against their will a people belonging to another continent. This is the view India takes of the situation in Kashmir, which it regards as a part of the Asian continent, and not subject to "foreign" intervention by the UN. This is an attitude fraught with serious consequences since, unlike the Western Europeans, the Russians have partly succeeded in their endeavor to qualify both as Europeans and Asians.

Status of Algeria

Nor did Algeria fully qualify as a "colonial" problem, since it was understood that the main issue at stake is how to alter the relationship between the Algerians and France, not to totally sever this relationship. A resolution unanimously adopted by the Assembly called on the parties to the conflict to enter into *pourparlers* (informal discussions), and reference was made to the offer of good offices by Tunisia and Morocco. French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau held frequent consultations with the representatives of these two newly independent nations, and has been reported favorably impressed by the speech King Mohammed V of Morocco delivered before the Assembly. Here we are not confronted with the struggle by a people of one continent to sever all connections with a nation belonging to another continent.

This, however, was the case in In-

donesia's efforts to evict the Dutch from West Irian. This question was clearly and unmistakably "colonial"—and also fraught with danger, as shown by subsequent events.

How About Indonesia?

The juridical aspect is open to dispute and conflicting interpretations, but the political consequences are very serious for Indonesia, which is the heir of the Dutch East Indies. To admit that any part of the former Dutch empire should remain outside the new nation means, for the Indonesians, to invite disruption and eventual collapse. Should the principle of the geographical identification between Indonesia and the former Dutch East Indies be denied, what is to prevent the elements favoring breakup of the Indonesian Republic from prevailing? The struggle for West Irian is being fought by Indonesia in the name of unity, and in this lies its political and international significance.

The change of heart by the industrialized countries toward economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries and a redefinition of the meaning of "colonialism" and "anti-colonialism" represent the most interesting new trends in the 1957 UN Assembly session. Their long-range implications may prove more significant than the sterile debate on disarmament or the stale tirades on coexistence.

Writer and lecturer, Mr. Rossi for the past four years has reported for *The Christian Science Monitor* on Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian and North African events as reflected at the United Nations.

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Can U.S. and U.S.S.R. Talk as 'Equals'?

In his State of the Union Message on January 9 President Eisenhower left the door open to negotiations with the Russians. Negotiations were hard enough in the past—and even then they did not prove what one could call a great success. They are going to be harder in the future, because something new has been added by the Russians. They call it “balance.” What they mean is “equality.” Or as Communist party boss Khrushchev has put it: no more three-against-one summit talks as was the case in Geneva.

Khrushchev's 'Balance' Theory

The U.S.S.R. put up with it during the war in the Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill talks. It put up with it at Potsdam in 1945 and more recently at Geneva. But those days are over, says Khrushchev. It is “balance” or no talks, according to Moscow—and who is to say that he doesn't mean it? “Balance” works this way: one Communist state meeting with one Western state, or two Communist states with two Western states, or three with three, and so on.

The pressure for East-West summit talks is mounting rapidly. It is apparent the world over. A Gallup poll, taken in 12 world capitals, shows that a majority everywhere wants a United States-U.S.S.R. summit meeting—from 81 percent in Bonn to 51 percent in London.

Why this global public pressure for a summit meeting of the United States and the U.S.S.R.? Why is all the world in favor of an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting before it knows whether a basis for agreement exists?

The answer is simple: 1957 ushered in a new era, call it the sputnik

era or the missile-satellite era. It is an era in which mankind is able, for the first time in human history, literally to blow itself to pieces. The people of the world are beginning to understand that awful possibility, and so they are ready to support any move which might hold back that ultimate disaster. They want coexistence, which the Russians preach, because it includes existence, which they cherish. The majority of the world's people would prefer the *status quo* to annihilation.

So they want the two great powers to explore George F. Kennan's ideas about a neutralized Central Europe, to find out what Mr. Khrushchev means by his proposal to keep nuclear arms out of both Germanys and possibly other European areas. In fact, they want Washington and Moscow, separately and together, to study anything and everything that might prevent a nuclear holocaust.

What About Our Allies?

Moscow's insistence on “balance” at any summit meeting creates its problems—and not just for the United States. Are our allies going to let Washington represent them in a huddle with Moscow? The United States has said it would not talk with Moscow about its allies' problems behind their backs. Are our allies now willing to make President Eisenhower their diplomatic spokesman or agent?

London and Paris, not to mention Washington, are hardly enthusiastic about a summit meeting that would pit London, Paris and Washington against Moscow and, say, Warsaw and Prague. They are even less enthusiastic about a Big Six meeting

that would include them and the U.S.S.R., plus Red China and either Poland or Czechoslovakia. That is “balance” as the Russians see it and want it. Yet the United States, or at least the Eisenhower Administration (or should one say, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles?) at present resist such a grouping. Yet sooner or later this issue will have to be faced and answered—not merely ignored.

The basic problem facing Mr. Dulles about a summit meeting is psychological. If he indicates the United States is ready to shift its position and policy anywhere (say, on Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Germany, NATO or Formosa), then diplomatic and political tremors are apt to run all around the free world. What is Mr. Dulles up to? people will ask. What is he preparing to give away? Whom is he preparing to sell down the river?

So Mr. Dulles chooses to sit tight. Any movement at this critical moment could touch off panic. Flexibility could be interpreted as uncertainty. And the United States cannot, above all else, suggest that the Soviet sputnik and ICBM have thrown it off balance diplomatically. Also any change suggests admission of past errors—and Mr. Dulles is not given to wasting energy on regrets.

So the pressure for some kind of United States-U.S.S.R. summit talks mounts. But the objections and suspicions also mount. So, too, do the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the budgets for new weapons. Yet a summit contact of East and West seems inevitable—although how or where or when or about what, no man in Washington knows as yet.

NEAL STANFORD



Awakening Africa—Promise or Threat?

The Asian-African Peoples Solidarity Conference, held with the approval of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt in Cairo on December 26-January 1, spotlighted the problems that Africa, last of the continents to experience the throes of the struggle for national independence, raises for United States policy-makers.

This gathering, unlike the Bandung conference held in Indonesia in 1955, brought together not government representatives but about 500 nongovernmental delegates from 40 states and colonies. And, in contrast to Bandung, to which no white nations—not even the Eurasian U.S.S.R.—had been invited, and where Communist China's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai held the center of the stage, Russia was not only included in the Cairo conference, but its spokesmen, some of them from Soviet Asia, played a key role. *The New York Times* correspondent, Os-good Caruthers, reported that "the longest and most rousing applause was awarded the head Soviet delegate. . . a beaming, Oriental-looking man named Sharaf R. Rashidov, who is president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, or Parliament, of the Uzbek Republic."

It was not surprising, therefore, that Communists dominated the proceedings and that the many resolutions adopted by the conferees, while denouncing Western colonialism and imperialism, contained not a word of criticism about the U.S.S.R. In this respect the Cairo gathering apparently ran counter to the policy of the host country, which, according to President Nasser, is not pro-Soviet but neutralist. Sensing this conflict between his own objectives and those

of the Communists who spoke for the peoples of Asia and Africa, President Nasser refrained from appearing at the opening meeting to extend his personal greetings to the conferees, as had been anticipated, and limited himself to giving a reception in their honor.

Yet President Nasser, in effect, granted the Communist bloc a base for anti-Western operations in Africa by permitting the establishment in Cairo of a headquarters for a permanent Asian-African Peoples Solidarity Council to be headed by an Egyptian, with Soviet and Communist Chinese representatives holding important posts in its ten-man secretariat. The significant thing is that while Nasser's aims—the aims of a fervent nationalist—are separate from those of the Soviet bloc, they run parallel.

Soviet Promises —

From the Western point of view the Cairo conference was an important propaganda move by Moscow to establish beachheads in Africa through contacts with individuals and groups who either openly support communism or share its aims. This, Western observers fear, means that the Russians, behind the screen of nongovernmental discussions, have laid the basis for a powerful network of Communist operations in the newly independent countries of Africa as well as in areas still seeking to achieve an independent status. And Soviet spokesmen held out to the delegates two promises which can be expected to capture their imagination.

First, they promised them economic and technical assistance. "We

are ready to help you as brother helps brother," declared Arzumanya A. Agofonovich, chairman of the International Economic Institute at the Moscow Academy of Sciences. "Tell us what you need, and we will help you and send, to the best of our capabilities, money in the form of loans or aid." Second, he held up to underdeveloped countries the example of the U.S.S.R., saying that the Soviet bloc had nationalized industry and trade as the "most rapid and effective policy for industrial expansion and the least painful to the population." The result was that the delegates adopted resolutions welcoming Soviet aid, even though its scope may well be limited by the important phrase, "to the best of our capabilities"; supporting nationalization of resources, trade and industry; and backing the Soviet demand for suspension of nuclear bomb tests and abolition of foreign military bases.

— And Threats

The rousing reception accorded to Soviet spokesmen, which neutralist or pro-Western delegates like some of the Tunisians found it impossible to check, has caused Western commentators to regard this conference as a dangerous symptom of the anti-Western movement now building up in Africa.

There is, however, another side to this picture. The very fact that the dice were so loaded against the West at the Cairo meeting brought about a reaction which was immediately noticeable in Egypt (the Cairo press played down the conference proceedings, avoiding the banner headlines it might have been expected to give

(Continued on page 80)



Italian Oil and the Middle East

by Jane Perry Clark Carey and
Andrew Galbraith Carey

Mrs. Carey, formerly assistant professor of government at Barnard College, lived in Italy in 1953 when she was a member of the Fulbright Commission for Italy and again in 1955 and 1957. Mr. Carey, a former business executive, was chief of the Industry Division of the Mutual Security Administration in Italy in 1953.

THE joint European-United States development fund for the Middle East proposed by Italy to Washington in December 1957 is a further indication of Italian interests in that area, in which the government-owned Italian oil company, the *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*, generally known as ENI, had already become a potent factor. Italy, strategically located in the Mediterranean for contacts with the Arab world and with a long history of trade in the Middle East and North Africa, now finds itself enlarging its former role in the Balkans to include one in the Mediterranean as a whole. It is ENI's oil ventures, however, which have made Italy a force more to be reckoned with in that area of the world than is generally realized.

Italy's Energy Needs

As the discoverer of practically all of Italy's vast store of natural gas and of a share of its oil within its own borders, ENI understandably wants its own oil sources at home and abroad. ENI sought but was refused admission to the consortium formed by the international oil companies in 1954, when Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's production and refining properties. ENI then started on a path which may not only affect all oil deals in the Middle East but may alter the course of international politics in that area.

Italy's need for oil from both foreign and domestic sources can hardly be overestimated, considering its lack of sources of energy and the rapidly rising demand. The only coal is

found in a few poor quality deposits; water as a source of hydroelectric power exists in significant quantity only in the North and has already been developed near its economic limit; nuclear energy for electric power and industrial purposes is not yet in production. The country's consumption of energy has doubled since 1949, and estimates indicate it will be doubled again before the end of the next decade. Future energy demands will have to be met increasingly by steam power stations, thus adding to fuel needs, except for the few stations using natural steam. Nuclear power plants will ultimately substitute heat generated by fission for that now available in oil or coal, but it will be some time before far-reaching substitution can occur.

Domestic Output Small

Italian production of coal and oil is so small that increasing energy demands necessitate larger imports of both. In 1956 only somewhat over a million tons of coal were produced in the country and 10 million were imported. The picture is somewhat brighter with respect to oil. At the end of World War II oil and gas were discovered in the Po Valley, but significant quantities of oil were found only in 1953, notably in Sicily. While the Sicilian wells, producing most of the oil in Italy, will probably produce some 2 million tons in 1958, the increase is far from sufficient for the growing demand now or in the foreseeable future. If it were not for the impressively large production of natural gas in Italy, imports of both

coal and oil would have to be larger still. Natural gas production, although increasing each year, cannot by itself erase that part of the trade deficit caused by fuel imports.

Most of Italy's imported oil comes from the Middle East, about half normally moving through the Suez Canal and somewhat under half by pipeline to the port of Saïda (Sidon) in Lebanon, with a small balance coming from other countries. In addition to the advantage which Italy has in its comparative proximity to the sources of Middle East supply, there is also an advantage in that payment for this oil is made in sterling. This helps to protect the country's dollar balance.

Italian oil demands are so great as to cause a struggle for control of domestic sources of supply and for advantages in bringing foreign oil to the country. ENI and the international oil companies have been the chief contenders. When Italy passed an oil law covering the mainland in January 1957, ENI lost its battle for a 60-40 division of profits instead of the 50-50 allocation to which the international companies were used in the Middle East, but otherwise ENI secured marked advantages. *Gulf Italia*, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil, withdrew from further attempts to obtain oil on the mainland of Italy. In 1926 the Fascist government had founded the *Azienda Generale Italiana dei Petroli*, always known as AGIP, as the government organization to search for oil.

With the coming of peace, the government took a stern look at AGIP's

accomplishments and its seemingly dim future and ordered its Northern director, Enrico Mattei, to close down the operation and sell its assets. It is reported that AGIP was offered to private companies for about a million dollars, but no buyer appeared. Mattei disregarded his instructions, kept his equipment and technicians, made sure his political fences were mended in Rome and went ahead with prospecting. His gamble turned out to be successful, for in late 1945 AGIP drill rigs struck a big natural gas field near Milan. This source of energy was tapped near the hub of Italy's heaviest industrial concentration, which needed gas for fuel.

Mattei: New Strong Man

Enrico Mattei's rise to fame has not been because of good fortune alone. He is one of postwar Italy's ablest but most controversial figures, who must be taken into account in any attempt to understand the power of ENI in Italy and the part it plays in Middle Eastern oil. The son of a policeman, Mattei is a good Catholic and a long-time Christian Democrat. He is that rarity in Italy, a top executive who rose from the ranks. A combination of brilliant organizer and administrator and an adroit politician with an unfailing grasp of good public relations techniques, looking like a prosperous American businessman, he is an aggressive promoter with the ability of making his dreams come true. He is not one to be crossed and if he cannot attain his ends by one means, he does by another, as he has in Iran.

Under Mattei's leadership AGIP discovered gas in the Po Valley in 1945 and since has found it in ever-increasing amounts throughout the Valley.

In 1953 the Italian Parliament created ENI, with Mattei as its head and AGIP as a subsidiary, devoted

to sales and distribution of oil products and a new subsidiary, AGIP-Mineraria, in control of natural gas and oil exploitation and production. ENI is essentially a holding company for all the governmental interests and investments in oil, gas and some other sources of energy. In addition to being given exclusive rights in the Po Valley, ENI is authorized to operate in competition with private industry in the rest of Italy. Above all, ENI is authorized "to engage in any activities of national interest in the field of hydrocarbons." This vast grant of power, coupled with Mattei's brilliant leadership, has made it possible for ENI to move forward into a veritable empire stretching beyond the confines of Italy. There are few aspects of Italian life in which ENI has not made itself felt, for the users of its varied products range from the giants of industry to the housewife who cooks with bottled gas.

ENI has stretched its mandate for activities of national interest in the field of hydrocarbons to nuclear energy, which possibly can be said to come within that definition. With Italy's acute shortage, ENI is rushing to complete two nuclear electric plants, one in the North and one in the South of Italy. One at least will begin to function in 1962.

Italy and Egypt

Outside of Italy ENI is searching for oil, taking it home or selling it where found, building pipelines and selling bottled gas to various countries of the Middle East, Somaliland, France and Spain, and it is beginning activities in Morocco. Yugoslav possibilities also loom on the horizon. ENI's attempt to secure concessions in Libya caused it once more to clash with the international oil companies. It is ENI's operations in Egypt and Iran, however, which

have brought it into the limelight of foreign affairs.

Italian interests in Egyptian oil have been growing since 1953, when the Egyptian National Oil Company was formed through a combination of different national groups, with ENI holding a controlling interest, to explore oil possibilities in the Sinai peninsula. With the growth of Egyptian nationalism the company set up a subsidiary, the Oriental Oil Company, of which Egyptian interests hold just under half the shares. The management and most of its technicians are young Italians trained in the Po Valley gas fields. The output of the wells they have drilled in Egypt is so high as to make Egypt a great new source of oil for Italy. At Belayim in 1957 the output was about a million tons of oil, and it is expected that the amount will reach 3 million in 1959, with other wells beginning to produce. ENI has other interests in Egypt, such as AGIP-Mineraria's refinery and gasoline stations which sell bottled gas as well as gasoline.

Friendliness to Nasser

Italy is anxious to play the role of mediator in general and hoped to accomplish this in Egypt in particular. Certainly growing Italian interests in Egypt had important political repercussions at the time of the Suez crisis. The newspaper controlled by ENI displayed notable friendliness to Nasser during the whole episode, for ENI has sympathy with nationalist aims both in Italy and outside. It was noteworthy that Italian personnel working for SNAM (ENI's pipeline affiliate) and the Italian steel works, Dalmine, in laying oil pipelines at the time of the fighting, were in no way disturbed.

ENI's operations in Iran have capped the climax of its overseas development to date and have brought

still further clashes with the international oil companies. Negotiations between AGIP-Mineraria and the Iranian government were secretly undertaken in August 1956, when the battle in Italy between ENI and the private oil companies over the division of spoils under the proposed oil law was at its height. On March 14, 1957, AGIP-Mineraria signed an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the nationalized oil concern of the Iranian government formerly belonging to the Anglo-Iranian Company. Capital is contributed by the two partners on a 50-50 basis. The new company, the *Societa Irano-Italiana dei Petroli* (SIRIP), was made responsible for oil prospecting and development in three much sought-after areas of Iran, known to be rich in oil.

New Terms

In at least two respects the agreement is a departure from the arrangements made by the international oil companies with the Iranian government. In any previous agreement the oil company paid either a lump sum when the concession was signed, or else agreed to pay annual rent throughout the period of exploration for oil, or both. The Italian-Iranian agreement provides that expenditures for production and transportation are to be shared in equal parts, but AGIP-Mineraria bears the cost of searching for oil. SIRIP, paying half the cost of operations, gets ground rent only when and if oil is found. AGIP-Mineraria may withdraw any time after the end of the first four years. So the door is still ajar to agreement with the consortium.

The Italo-Iranian agreement outwardly conforms to the accepted standard by which, after payment of taxes and royalty, profits are divided on a 50-50 basis. Actually there is more than meets the eye in the Italian

plan. The Iranian government is given half the net profits, but the other half is divided between the two partners in proportion to the capital held by each. As AGIP-Mineraria and NIOC each hold a half interest, they each get 25 percent. NIOC, however, is a government corporation, so the Iranian government actually secures 75 percent of the profits.

ENI and Public Opinion

It seems fair to say that a large segment of Italian public opinion views ENI favorably regarding both its domestic and foreign activities. Italians have long been used to "government-in-business." Some distrust the power and wealth of ENI and the "statism" inherent in such a government concern. To others, the power of ENI seems a method of keeping Italian oil for the Italians and of obtaining needed foreign oil for Italy. Mattei's policies have strong appeal to many Italian nationalists and to those with secret sympathy for Arab nationalism. The most far-reaching criticism of ENI concerns the lack of control of its activities by responsible parliamentary authorities. Despite legal provisions for control of ENI, Parliament and the ministries have tended so far to keep their hands off an organization which is profitable, effective, high in public regard and run by as dominant a man as Mattei.

Why did ENI give more advantageous terms to Iran than any other oil company had in the past? Mattei believes himself charged with the responsibility of seeing that Italy's oil requirements are met. As Italy's own soil may never yield enough to make it independent of oil imports, Mattei looks abroad for a sure source of supply and wants to lower the cost of oil imports to Italy.

Many observers see in the Italian-Iranian agreement the death blow to

the 50-50 division of profits. A contract made in December 1957 between the Japanese and the Saudi Arabians may be a straw to indicate that the wind is blowing in that direction. In the final analysis the future of the new profits division will be determined by whether it proves more profitable than the old, per ton of oil secured.

ENI's willingness to make a Middle Eastern country a partner in the development of its oil may prove more important in the future than the much-discussed division of profits. This move should help Middle Eastern countries stand on their own feet and assume some responsibility for the well-being of their people. But insofar as it merely fans violent Arab nationalism, it could prove dangerous.

While Italy has barely begun to deal in Middle Eastern oil, ENI's entry into the picture makes Italy a force to be reckoned with in Middle Eastern affairs. For this reason alone Rome's proposals for this area, as presented by Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in December 1957, deserve careful study.

READING SUGGESTIONS: *Annual Report and Balance Sheet* (Rome, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI). Published April 30 each year beginning 1954); John Cairncross, "The Future of Italian Natural Gas and Oil," *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review* (Rome, December 1954); Frank Gervasi, three articles on Italian oil, *New York Post*, August 13, 14 and 15, 1957; Articles on Enrico Mattei: Bill Richardson, *New York Post*, August 12, 1957, Barrett McGurn, *New York Herald-Tribune*, December 13, 1957, *The New York Times*, January 6, 1958. Saverio Iardi, "Laws Controlling Hydrocarbon Prospecting and Mining in Italy," *Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy* (Rome, Banco di Roma, May 1957); *Petroleum Press Service*, four articles on Italian oil interests, May and October, 1956, May and September, 1957; "State Participations and Public Corporations in Italy, 1957," Special Issue, *Daily Report on Italian Home and Foreign Affairs* (Rome, "East-West" News Agency, October 15, 1957.)

Spotlight

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the occasion), and in time may emerge in other areas of Africa as well. This does not mean that Africans will be less critical of the West. But the possibility that responsible and thoughtful African leaders may, like Nasser, prefer neutralism to out-and-out cooperation with the Soviet bloc should not be discounted by Washington.

U.S.: Dangers and Hopes

But if anti-Westernism is to be averted in Africa, the United States will have to show sympathetic understanding of the motives that animate the peoples of the no longer "dark continent." We must, in the first place, understand that the desire for self-determination, even if for practical political and economic reasons it cannot yet take the form of national independence, is as natural a feeling for Algerians or Nigerians as it has been in past centuries for the French or Germans, the Italians or the American colonists. The fact that, owing to the 19th-century settlement of Europeans in some parts of Africa, this desire must now be reconciled with the interests of Western nations should not obscure its significance or the need to satisfy it as soon as possible. Otherwise, the

feeling, already strong in Africa, that the United States, when confronted with a choice, as in Algeria, tends to support its Western allies in preference to the native populations, will gain ground. And then in Africa, as in Asia and the Middle East, Russia could again, at no expense, emerge as the champion of nationalism.

Second, Americans must learn to distinguish between African attitudes inspired by ideological attachment to communism and those which are inspired by concern for local political, economic and social maladjustments and long-pent-up grievances against Western colonial rulers. For the West one of the most poignant dilemmas of our times is this very fact that the underdeveloped peoples, and their leaders, can and often do honestly agree with the slogans publicized and the objectives endorsed by Communists, yet do not necessarily believe in or support Communist ideology.

This dilemma is due, in the first instance, to the Communists' ingenuity in discovering the basic motivations of Asians, Arabs and Africans and then translating them into appealing propaganda. There is no reason why Westerners should not be equally or more ingenious in identifying the interests of Africans with democratic concepts—provided, and this is the most difficult test of

all, we can genuinely abandon "white" preconceptions and put ourselves intellectually and emotionally in the Africans' place.

For the United States, particularly, this presents the third, and most challenging, test. We have here the advantage of sharing this nation's life with our Negro fellow citizens, who themselves, understandably, have a special interest in the development and achievements of the peoples of Africa. In our own midst we daily experience the threat that comes from failures to accept true equality among human beings, irrespective of color. But we also experience the glowing promise of achieving, through integration, the genuine democracy which, in a far more dramatic way than the missile race, could effectively challenge communism.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the fifth of eight articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1958"—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?"—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

FPA Bookshelf

The Statesman's Year-Book 1957 (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1957, \$8.50), edited by S. H. Steinberg. This is the most useful statistical and historical reference book in compact form available. Revised annually, it contains information on even the tiniest countries in the world, as well as most international organizations.

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